This paper argues that global value chains (GVCs) have functioned as a vehicle for 'Made in China' products to enter international markets, especially markets of high-income countries. The analysis of the paper focuses on China's processing exports, a subset of GVC activities. It demonstrates that, by participating in GVCs Chinese firms bundle processing exports with advanced technologies and globally recognized brands of lead firms, and then sell them to consumers of international markets through distribution networks of GVCs. Using panel data of bilateral processing exports covering more than 100 of China's trade partners, the paper shows empirically there exists a significantly positive correlation between the share of processing exports and the income of trading partners, implying that processing trade is an effective means for 'Made in China' products to enter high-income countries. The cross-country heterogeneity of processing exports also indicates China captures relatively more value added in its exports to low-income countries than to high-income countries.
Introduction
After three and half decades of rapid economic growth, China has surpassed Germany, Japan and the US and emerged as the largest exporting nation. 'Made in China' products are now ubiquitous in markets of both developed and developing countries, ranging from labor-intensive products, such as T-shirts and shoes to high-tech products such as mobile phones and digital cameras. For some consumers outside of China, it seems impossible to live without 'Made in China' products (Bongiomi, 2008) .
Why are China's exports so competitive in the global market? What are the major forces driving the worldwide expansion and diversification of its manufacturing exports? Many academic scholars and China observers have tried to answer the questions from various aspects. A plethora of articles analyzing drastic growth of China's exports have been published in academic journals, magazines and newspapers. According to these studies, fundamental factors determining significant growth and worldwide expansion of China's exports include: (1) abundant labor endowment and corresponding comparative advantage in labor-intensive products (Adams, Gangnes, & Shachmurove, 2006; Wang, 2006) ;
(2) reforms of domestic institutions, such as the transition to a market oriented economy, the adoption of export-led growth strategy and unilateral trade liberalization (Hu & Khan, 1997; Lin, Cai, & Li, 2003) ; (3) improved market access for China's exports through institutional arrangements, namely the WTO membership, bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements and the abolishment of multi-fiber arrangement (Branstetter & Lardy, 2006; Prasad, 2009 ); (4) exchange rate regime adopted by the Chinese government and undervalued currency (Marquez & Schindler, 2007; Thorbecke & Smith, 2010) ; and (5) massive inflows of export oriented foreign direct investment (Whalley & Xin, 2010; Zhang & Song, 2000) .
With a population of more than 1.4 billion, China is naturally endowed with comparative advantage in labor-intensive products. Assuming other factors determining global competitiveness are equal across countries, the relatively low labor cost should grant Chinese exports an edge over their competitors. Without any doubts, trade liberalization since 1990s in terms of tariff reductions and trade facilitations has substantially improved the market access of Chinese exports. Comparative advantage and trade liberalization arguments, however, mainly emphasize production costs and barriers to cross-country flows of goods, they fail to take into consideration the critical roles performed by the organization structures of modern trade in promoting China's exports, in particular its successful penetration into high-income countries. Those arguments actually leave many important questions unanswered. Without foreign brands, could 'Made in China' products maintain the same competitiveness? Whenever Apple launches new cutting-edge products, the shipment of Apple products from China to the rest of the world increases and continues to grow along with the rising popularity of Apple products. To whom should be given credits for the increase, innovative American company Apple, or assembler Foxcon, a Taiwanese company located in mainland China, which has been banking on cheap Chinese labor?
In the classic models of Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin, comparative advantage represents a sole factor determining competitiveness and trade patterns. Today's trade, nonetheless, is not 'wine for clothes'. The proliferation of global value chains has transformed trade in goods into trade in tasks (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) . Many firms located in various geographic locations jointly deliver ready-to-use products to consumers of the global market. The comparative advantage of an individual country cannot decide the competitiveness of products manufactured along GVCs. Brands, global distribution networks and technology innovations perform far more important roles in determining winners and losers. GVCs are particular relevant to China's exports, as about half of its manufacturing exports are assembled with imported parts and components, and most so-called 'Made in China' products either carry brands owned by multinational enterprises (MNE) or are distributed by global retail giants such as Wal-Mart.
In this paper, we attempt to interpret China's export boom in the context of value chains. We argue that GVCs have been functioning as a vehicle for Chinese exports entering international markets, especially markets of high-income countries. By successfully plugging into GVCs, Chinese firms have been able to bundle their low-skilled labor services with globally recognized brands and advanced technologies of MNEs, and then sell them to consumers of international markets. GVCs are actually a catalyst for 'Made in China' products; strictly speaking, they show China's value added embedded in its manufacturing exports, being bought and consumed in various nations. Continuous technology innovations, aggressive promotions on brand and the worldwide development of distribution networks by lead firms of GVCs, constantly expand and create new demand, which in turn raises demand for tasks performed by Chinese firms integrated with supply chains and this eventually enhances China's exports.
To establish this argument, we first examine tasks performed by Chinese firms in GVCs and domestic value added in its exports. The analysis starts with a case of the iPhone, of which has China been the exclusive exporter, then extends the coverage to high-tech products, where China claims to be the No. 1 exporter in the world (Meri, 2009) , and further expands the scope to processing exports, which includes both high-tech and ordinary manufacturing goods.
Following the descriptive analysis, we empirically analyze the intensity of processing exports in China's bilateral trade and its correlation with the income of destination markets. Processing exports refers to exports manufactured or assembled with imported parts and components. Assembly and processing are typical segments of value chains and belong to low value added tasks. Processing exports not only reveal tasks the Chinese firms perform, but also provide a direct measure of exports associated with GVC participation. The empirical investigation is based on a unique panel data set, covering China's processing exports to more than 100 economies from 1993-2013. We find China's processing exports mainly end up with high-income countries and the intensity of processing exports, defined as the share of processing exports in bilateral exports has a significantly positive relation with the income of destination markets, implying that processing exports has functioned as an effective means for 'Made in China' products to enter markets of high-income countries. China's exports to high-income countries benefit substantially from GVC's spillover effects associated with brands, distribution networks and technology innovations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we will briefly summarize spillover effects of GVCs to Chinese firms involved in supply chains. The analysis focuses on spillover effects of brands, distribution networks and technology innovations; Section 3 will discuss the roles and tasks performed by Chinese firms in exports manufactured and traded along GVCs. The discussion concentrates on representative products -iPhone, high-tech products and processing exports; in Section 4, we will investigate the relative importance of processing exports in China's bilateral trade, and empirically analyze the correlation between the intensity of processing exports and the income of its trading partners; Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the paper.
Spillover Effects of Global Value Chains
A global value chain comprises a series of tasks necessary for delivering a product from its inception to final consumers in international markets, including research and development, product design, manufacturing parts and components, assembly and distribution, which are carried out by firms located in various countries (Gereffi & Karina, 2011) . According to governance structures, GVCs can be classified into producer-driven and buyer-driven value chains. Producer-driven chains are generally developed by technology leaders in automobiles, aircrafts, computers, semiconductors and other capital-intensive industries; buyer-driven chains are typically developed by large retailers, branded marketers and branded manufacturers (Gereffi, 1999) . In the context of a property-rights model, the characterization of ownership allocation along value chains can also depend on incentives to integrate suppliers and the elasticity of demand faced by final-good producers (Antràs & Chor, 2013) .
Technology advancement, unprecedented liberalization in trade and investment and profit seeking behaviors of MNEs have been driving the emergence of GVCs in the last decades (OECD, 2013) . Today, most manufacturing commodities are actually produced and traded along value chains. GVCs have also been extended into business process and management, such as software development and maintenance and voice services. Like an invisible hand, GVCs have interconnected national economies. The economic integration through value chains is fundamentally market driven and tends to be more stable and effective than that led by institutional arrangements or defined by conventional armslength trade. The theory of international trade suggests that specializations according to comparative advantage improve the efficiency of resource allocations and hence the welfare of trading nations. Compared with conventional specializations on industries or products, specializations on tasks defined by value chains further refine specializations among nations and enhance the efficiency of resource allocations, consequently raising the productivity and economy growth of all economies involved.
Here we would like to emphasize spillover effects of GVCs at micro-level and discuss how spillover effects generated by intangible assets of lead firms, such as brands, distribution networks and technology innovations, help Chinese firms overcome entry barriers of international markets and achieve dramatic global expansion. Cheap labor is often addressed as a comparative advantage of Chinese firms. It seems that as long as companies could manufacture products at competitive costs, they would be able to sell their products and compete in the global market. As a matter of fact, the competition in the global market is much more complicated than this kind of simple reasoning. Production costs are just one of many factors deciding the success in international markets. As barriers to entry in manufacturing fall, intangible assets such as brands and global distribution networks have turned into major hurdles to firms of developing countries, which strive to take part in the world market (Kaplinsky, 2000) .
Generally, consumers of developed countries tend to be brand oriented and have high willingness to pay for particular brands. Brands are one of the critical factors that determine consumers' choices (Bronnenberg, Dube, & Gentzkow, 2012) . Owing to asymmetric information, consumers regard brands as an assurance of product quality. Switching costs may also undermine consumers' willingness to substitute preferred brands with new alternatives. Consumers' biases to particular brands grant advantage to incumbent producers and raise barrier to new entries. For instance, branded clothing constitutes the majority of the European clothing market, with around 80% market share. So only 20% is left to private labels and non-branded clothing (Thelle, Jeppesen, & Hvidt, 2013) . Despite more than three decades high growth, Chinese firms have not nurtured a significant number of globally recognized brands. So far, only one Chinese brand, Huawei, is on the list of 2014 global brands. Creating and sustaining global brands requires lavish advertising budgets and global promotion campaigns, which is beyond the capacity of most Chinese firms when they in the early stage of their development. Owners of global brands usually lead buyer-driven value chains (Gereffi, 1999) . By plugging into buyer-driven value chains as assemblers, part producers, or original equipment makers, Chinese firms are able to circumvent the disadvantage in brands and take advantage of consumers' preferences towards international brands. Compared with non-branded products with equal or even lower costs, the labels of international brands strengthen the competitiveness of 'Made in China' products and enhance their appeal to consumers. The preferences of brand-oriented consumers are implicitly transformed into the demand for 'Made in China' products. Without any doubts, China's exports would fall substantially if the attached foreign brands were removed.
In addition, to a large extent, new and fast growing markets have been nurtured by technology innovations and product inventions. Revolutionary innovations in information and communication technology (ICT) have given rise to a variety of new products, such as laptop computers, smart phones and tablets, thus dramatically stimulating consumers' demand beyond traditional commodities. In 2012, ICT goods emerged as some of top products traded globally. The world imports of ICT goods rose to US$2 trillion, about 11% of world merchandise trade and exceeded trade in agriculture and motor vehicles (UNCTAD, 2014) . If not all, then most intellectual properties of ICT products are owned by the MNEs of developed countries. Compared with established MNEs, Chinese firms do not have comparative advantage in high-tech products. Constrained by limited human resources, insufficient investment in research and development, and relatively short learning-by-doing history, Chinese firms face challenges to market products with their own intellectual properties and compete with incumbent technology leaders. The global expansion of value chains, on the other hand, offers an alternative for Chinese firms to participate in the markets of high-tech products and benefit from the fast growing demand for these products, regardless of their disadvantages. By participating in the value chains of high-tech products and specializing in low value added segments, such as assembly and production of low-tech components, Chinese firms are able to join the value creation processes of hightech products and grow together with lead firms. The unit value added of the segment may be relatively small, for instance assembly adds only $6.5 per iPhone (Xing & Detert, 2010) . The sheer size of the world market implies a huge growth potential and economies of scale. Being a part of value chains, Chinese firms can enjoy the spillover effect of lead firms' technology innovations. It is imperative to clarify that the spillover emphasized here differs from that defined in conventional literature of technology and productivity growth. It refers to an opportunity of joining and benefiting from markets of high-tech products, where Chinese firms have neither the necessary intellectual properties nor comparative advantage. As a matter of fact, China's leading positions in exports of laptop computers, digital cameras, mobiles and other ICT products have been achieved via specializing on low value added task-assembly of those products rather than on indigenous technology innovations.
Finally, selling products in world markets requires global distribution networks. The existence of a basic marketing and distribution infrastructure is a prerequisite for supply and demand to be interconnected with one another. The buyer-seller links between exporters and overseas buyers is an important channel for the diffusion of knowledge and information (Wgan & Mody, 1992) . In any value chains, lead firms are buyers and responsible for marketing and distribution. They set up product standards and instruct suppliers upstream of chains about what to be produced. Through such contacts suppliers learn the nature of the potential market, and lead firms exercise direct quality control and often transfer valuable design, packaging and production know-how to suppliers (Gereffi, 1999) . Hence, the required buyer-seller relations for exporting commodities to foreign markets are naturally built in GVCs. For firms without their own global distribution networks, joining GVCs can mitigate information deficiency, reduce transaction costs and facilitate market access. Taking advantage of GVC's spillover effects in distribution networks, Chinese firms involved in GVCs have not only entered the world market successfully, but have also been free of concerns about marketing their products to consumers in dispersed geographic locations. For example, Wal-Mart, if counted as a 'nation', is the seventh largest trading partner of China and imports more than $18 billion goods from China annually (Lee, Gereffi, & Barrientos, 2011) . The retail networks of Wal-Mart provide an essential marketing and distributions infrastructure for 'Made in China' products. Chinese suppliers use the retail networks as a vehicle to reach consumers in the US and in other foreign markets.
GVCs and Global Expansion of China's Exports
In this section, we will take a few representative goods as examples to intuitively illustrate the contribution of GVCs to the global expansion of Chinese exports. Since the launch of the first generation iPhone, China has been the exclusive exporter of iPhones. In 2009, it exported 11.3 million iPhones valued at $2.0 billion to the US. In spite of rising wages and the cumulative appreciation of the Yuan, China's iPhone exports to the US continued to grow and surged to $8.5 billion, more than triple the figure in 2012. During the same period, the Chinese Yuan appreciated 8.2% against the US dollar from $1 equals 6.83 Yuan to 6.31 Yuan. The average annual wage of Chinese workers rose close to 50% from 34,000 Yuan to 50,000 Yuan. In terms of exchange rates and wages, China's comparative advantage in labor costs actually deteriorated, and thus cannot explain the drastic increase in iPhone exports.
Furthermore, that China exports iPhones to the US, where the iPhone was invented, appears inconsistent with classic theory of comparative advantage. The strange trade pattern, however, can easily be explained by GVCs. On the back of each iPhone, there is a statement 'Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China'. The message unambiguously reveals the actual task performed by China in manufacturing iPhones. Compared with other smart phones, the iPhone is the most expensive, with a more than 60% gross profit margin (Xing & Detert, 2010) . The value chain of the iPhone is governed by Apple. Therefore, the competitiveness of the iPhone and its fast global expansion should be attributed to the technology innovations of Apple rather than China's comparative advantage -i.e. low labor cost. It is critical to emphasize that what China exports via the iPhone is the services of low-skilled labor but not advanced technology. It is the iPhone supply chain that provides an opportunity for Chinese firms to sell labor services to all users of iPhones. The international production fragmentation of the iPhone enables Chinese firms to be one of the beneficiaries of Apple's technology innovations.
iPhone trade is not unique. Most of China's exports in high-tech products follow the same fashion. They are manufactured and delivered through various GVCs. In recent years, high-tech products have emerged as a major export item, accounting for about one third of China's total manufacturing exports. In 2012, China exported US$600 billion high-tech goods, more than ten times higher compared with in 2002. The exponential growth of high-tech exports has been driven by the extension of high-tech supply chains into China. To a great extent, it is international fragmentations of high-tech manufacturing processes that bring Chinese firms into the game of exporting high-tech products. In order to utilize China's abundant labor, many high-tech MNEs have relocated manufacturing facilities into China or outsourced low value added tasks to firms there. According to Xing (2014b) , foreign invested firms produce more than 80% of China's high-tech exports. More importantly, about 80% of China's high-tech exports falls into the category of processing trade and has relatively low domestic value added. Domestic value added in exports measures the dependence of exports on foreign contents and vertical integration of its industries with international production networks. Figure 1 shows the share of domestic value added of China's processing of high-tech exports from 1997 to 2012. It was as low as 25% in 1997 and gradually increased to 45% by 2012. Despite a substantial increase in domestic contents, foreign value added remains above 50%, suggesting that processing of high-tech exports is a result of GVC operations. Given that most key components used in high-tech exports are imported and Chinese firms perform mainly low skilled tasks, the technology sophistication of China's high-tech exports is primarily determined by the technology innovations of lead firms. In other words, technology spillovers of GVCs raise the sophistication and the competitiveness of China's processing high-tech exports, thus eventually fostering its rapid expansion in the global market. Some researchers (e.g. Branstetter & Lardy, 2006) argue that these products are not high-tech but commodities as they can be manufactured in large volumes. We do not agree with this argument. These products still represent technology frontiers, but tasks performed by Chinese firms, such as assembly and making non-core components, are low skilled.
To investigate the critical role of GVCs beyond high-tech exports, we extend the discussion into processing exports, a subset of GVCs' activities. Since China adopted an export-led growth strategy, processing exports has been promoted as a major trade regime. In 2012, it amounted US$860 billion, about 42% of China's total exports. During the high growth period of 1997-2007, it grew faster than ordinary exports and generally exceeded 50% of China's total exports (Figure 2 ). Foreign invested firms play a dominant role in processing exports and are responsible for more than 75% (Ma & Assche, 2011) of this work. The analysis on the geographic origins of processing imports, the inputs used for producing exports and the destination markets of processing exports shows that East Asian economies are the major origins while G-7 countries are the main destinations (Xing, 2012) . The triangle trade pattern formed by processing trade outlines an aggregated GVC with China in the middle. Similar to processing high-tech exports, foreign value added accounts for a large portion of the value added in processing exports too. Figure 2 shows the estimated domestic value added in two distinct groups of processing exports: one with imported materials and the other with materials supplied by foreign contractors. In the former, the share of domestic content averaged 33%, while in the latter it was 23% during the period of 1993-2012. Significantly, a low share of domestic value added suggests excessive dependence of processing exports on foreign contents and a high degree of vertical integration with foreign firms. In fact, in the case of processing exports with supplied materials, Chinese firms simply assemble supplied parts and components together and then send the assembled products to foreign contractors, who are responsible for product designs, material procurements and marketing. Therefore, through different channels and at different fragments of GVCs, brands, distribution networks and technology innovations of lead firms have all contributed to rapid growth and impressive global expansion of China's processing exports.
Processing Exports and China's Exports to High-income Countries
China has turned into the largest import source of the US, Japan and the European Union. Shares of China's exports in these markets are disproportionally high compared with its weight in the world economy. Generally, the markets of high-income countries tend to be more competitive and thus more challenging for firms of developing countries to enter and gain market share. As argued above, firms participating in GVCs are able to benefit from brands, technology innovations and distribution networks, which are indispensable for competing in the global market. A few studies (e.g. Ma & Assche, 2011; Xing, 2012) show that China's processing exports mainly end up in the markets of the US, Japan and the EU. By definition, processing exports are synonymous with GVCs. The significant presence of processing exports actually underline the vehicle role of GVCs in facilitating 'Made in China' products to enter high-income countries. To empirically investigate the vehicle role of processing trade, we first calculate the shares of processing exports in China's exports to six individual countries: the US, Japan, Germany, Turkey, India and Vietnam. All of these countries are important trading partners of China and represent high, middle and low-income countries respectively. Figure 3 summarizes the results from 1993 to 2013. It is straightforward to see a divergence between high-income (the US, Japan and Germany) and low-income (India and Vietnam) countries. In the former, processing exports accounted for more than 55% on average while in the latter about 20%. Specifically, processing exports comprised about 65% of China's exports to the US on average and even exceeded 70% during the period of 1996-1999. Before 2005, processing exports to both Japan and Germany grew rapidly, much faster than ordinary exports. As a result, the share of processing exports to Japan rose to 59% in 2005 from 43% in 1993 while to Germany it increased to 62% from 54%. In recent years, shares of processing exports gradually declined from a peak but remained more than 50% for the US and Japan.
On the contrary, processing exports on average accounted for 30% of China's exports to Turkey, 23% to India and 21% to Vietnam during the period -much lower than to highincome countries. The simple descriptive statistics imply that processing exports mainly target high-income countries. To examine the stability of the correlation, we expand the sample size by including all of China's partners in processing exports in 2012. The sample consists of 115 countries. We use the sample to draw a scatter chart of the share of processing exports versus the income of destination markets. Figure 4 shows the scatter chart, where the vertical axis denotes the share of processing exports and the horizontal axis GDP per capita. The logarithm of both variables is used in the chart. It unambiguously reveals a positive log-linear relation between the share of processing exports and the income, suggesting that the proportion of processing exports is an increasing function of the income of destination markets. To formally test the correlation, we specify the regression model as
where p jt represents the share of processing exports in China's exports to country j, defined as a ratio of processing exports to total exports to country j in year t. The specified model can be considered as a derivative of two gravity equations, one is a gravity equation of processing exports and the other a gravity equation of total exports. Since the GDP of China and its trading partners as well as geographic distance are usually included in gravity equations, these variables are assumed to be cancelled after the first gravity equation is divided by the second one. y jt denotes GDP per capita of country j. It measures the preferences of foreign consumers to processing exports. As argued above, consumers of developed economies tend to have strong preferences toward branded and technology goods. Figure 3 and 4 intuitively suggest a positive correlation between the intensity of processing exports and the income level of China's trading partner. y jt is the focus of the estimation. ex ust represents the nominal exchange rate of The Yuan to the US dollar, calculated as the price of the US dollar in terms of the Chinese Yuan. We use the exchange rate of the Yuan to the US dollar rather than bilateral exchange rates for two reasons. First, more than 80% of China's exports are priced and settled in the US dollar. Second, processing exports is a subset of GVC's activities. In general, only one currency, usually the US dollar, is used to settle transactions between firms involved in the same GVCs.
EA is a dummy variable, proxying the impact of GVCs in East Asia. GVCs show significant regional bias. Chinese companies engaging in processing exports mainly take part in production networks in East Asia. It is necessary to include a dummy variable to capture the regional bias. EA takes the value 1 if j belongs to East Asia, zero otherwise. WTO is another dummy, testing the impact of China's entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001. It is equal to 1 after 2001, zero otherwise. Epot is also a dummy variable and identifies trading partners serving as an entrepôt, where a substantial part of China's exports to these economies is re-exported to third countries. Hong Kong, Macao and Luxembourg are defined as entrepôts in the estimation. Independent variable T is employed to capture the trend of processing exports.
Data used for the estimation are drawn from various sources. Statistics on bilateral processing exports and total exports covering 21 years from 1993-2013 are provided by the office of China Customs. GDP per capita and foreign exchange rates are downloaded from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank and the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. After preparing variables for estimation, there are 2401 observations. We test the stationarity of dependent variable ln(p jt ) and the result shows that it is stationary. Table 1 reports estimation results based on the ordinary least squared (OLS) and the fixed effect models. Estimates of the OLS are listed as a reference. Here we only explain estimates of the fixed effect model.
The R-squared shows that the fixed effect model can explain 72% of the variation of the dependent variable. The coefficient of GDP per capita y is 0.705 and statistically significant at 1%, implying that the share of processing exports to high-income countries is larger than that to low-income countries. It supports our hypothesis that processing exports function as an effective vehicle for Chinese exports to enter markets of developed countries. A 1% increase in GDP per capita will be expected to raise the share of processing exports 2 percentage point. The coefficient of exchange rate ex ust is 0.392 and statistically significant at 1%. ex ust is the price of the dollar in terms of the Chinese Yuan. The positive coefficient implies that the depreciation of the Yuan against the US dollar would increase the share of processing exports and vice versa. According to the estimate, a 1% appreciation of the Yuan would give rise to a 1.48 percentage point decrease in the share of processing exports. The Chinese Yuan has appreciated about 35% cumulatively against the US dollar since 2005. Meanwhile, the share of processing exports in China's total exports fell to 39% in 2013 from its peak of 57%. The empirical result provides evidence that the appreciation of the Yuan undermined China's comparative advantage in the assembly task of GVCs, thus undercutting overall growth of China's exports. The estimated coefficient of dummy variable T is -0.0157 and is statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that the share of processing exports trended lower. The WTO dummy is positive but insignificant.
Moreover, the empirical result reveals that China's processing exports are not uniformly distributed across trading partners, and there exists significant cross-country heterogeneity. As demonstrated above, processing exports incorporate more than 50% of foreign value added. To a large extent, the share of processing exports determines the proportion of domestic value added embedded in China's bilateral exports. The low intensity of processing exports implies high domestic value added. In other words, China captures relatively more value added in its exports to low-income countries compared with that to high-income ones.
Concluding Remarks
As the center of global assembly, Chinese exporting firms have been closely integrated with GVCs. Besides intrinsic comparative advantage, rapid growth and worldwide expansion of China's exports should be examined in the context of GVCs. To investigate the contribution of GVCs to China's exports, in particular exports to high-income countries, we focus on processing exports, a subset of GVC activities. Our analysis shows that China's processing exports benefit substantially from spillover effects of GVCs in brands, global distribution networks and technology innovations of lead firms. By taking part in GVCs, Chinese firms bundle low-skilled labor services with globally recognized brands and advanced technology, then sell these services to global consumers. More than 50% of foreign value added imbedded in processing exports suggests that, to a large extent, the competitiveness of processing exports is determined by foreign contents rather than China's comparative advantage and indigenous technology innovations.
Processing exports actually function as a vehicle for 'Made in China' to enter the markets of high-income countries. While shares of processing exports to high-income countries, such as the US and Japan exceed more than 50%, the share to low-income countries is as low as 20%. The regression analysis shows that there exists a significant positive correlation between the share of processing exports and the income of import countries, providing empirical evidence on the facilitating role of GVCs for 'Made in China' products to penetrate the markets of high-income countries. The cross-country heterogeneity of processing exports suggests that China actually captures relatively more value added from its exports to low-income countries than to high-income ones.
